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Definition of attack in context of high level interaction honeypots

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Authors: Pavol Sokol, Matej Zuzčák, Tomáš Sochor

Abstract

The concept of attack in the context of honeypots plays an important role. Based on the definition of the attack, honeypots obtain information about attackers, their targets, methods, and tools. This paper focuses on the definition of attack in context of high-interaction server honeypots. Paper proposes the definition of attack from the perspective of information security and network forensics analysis.

Introduction

Network security is an important part of security policies in each organization.
Traditional tools (e.g. iptables, snort, surricata) and approaches applied in protection
are currently becoming increasingly ineffective. It is due to the fact that the “bad”
community (e.g. hackers) is always several steps ahead of defensive mechanisms
(firewalls, IDS, IPS etc.). Therefore it is necessary to learn as much information as
possible about the attackers. The specialized environment, in which vulnerabilities
have been deliberately introduced in order to observe attacks and intrusions, has been
introduced 20 years ago and it is called a honeypot. It can be defined as “a
computing resource, whose value is in being attacked”. The honeypot computer
system is “a system that has been deployed on a network for the purpose of logging
and studying attacks on the honeypot.” [1].
Honeypots can be classified into several types. Two classifications are used in
this paper. The former classification is based on the level of interaction. From this
point of view, it is distinguished between low-interaction and high-interaction
honeypots. The difference between these types lies in an extent, to which the attacker
is allowed to interact with the system. Low-interaction honeypots implement targets
to attract or detect attackers using software to emulate the characteristics of a particular operating system and its network services on a host operating system.
Examples of this type of honeypot are Dionaea [2] and HoneyD [3].
In order to get more accurate information about attackers, their methods and
attacks, a complete operating system with all services must be used. This type of
honeypot is called high-interaction honeypot. The goal of this type of honeypot is to
provide an attacker access to the complete operating system, where nothing is
emulated, nor restricted [1].
Another classification of honeypots is based on the role of honeypot. According to
this classification, honeypots are divided in server-side honeypots and client-side
honeypots. Server side honeypots are useful in detecting new exploits, collecting
malware, and enriching research of the threat analysis. On the other hand, client-side
honeypots collect information about client side attacks. They detect attacks directed
against vulnerable client applications, when a client interacts with malicious servers.
The aim of these honeypots is to search and detect these malicious servers. This paper
focuses on server-side high-interaction honeypots.